ADMINISTRATION OF PLANKING IN LESOTHO : THE SECOND LAG
.. . the old fashioned doctrine has prevailed (as i t always does where administration is devoid of economic advice) and has been reflected in the . . laissez-faire attitudes of the British authorities to th:e Basotho's economic problems* This complacent ^fallacy explains the t o t a l. ineffectiveness of ; the British administrators' so-called 'development' , f. programmesc They have tinkered away with the trivia"'" VT of infrastructure-, and .with disconnected p ilot :r schemes, and have nagged away at the bewildered farmer'-to-achieve-miracles from his five acres of eroded land.
'
The ■ 'leader of the Basutoland Congress Party, Ntsu Mokhehle, complained-at the time that British money was doing no more i than financing government services and such other infrastructure 'as is conducive to Her Majesty's Government's concept of maintaining a colony. Not a single industry has been. 7 established'.
I I
Riggs acknowledged what he described as 'the spectre of determinsm' in his ecological approach to development administration but rejected the view of administrative behaviour as ' nothing more than the outcome of a particular configuration of interacting pressures'.
He asserted rather that both the influence of the new environment upon the subject and the subject upon its environment should be g specified.
While the v a lid ity of this point is recognized, in this assessment of the likehood of a second lag in establishing the machinery and processes of planning, the 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECOND LAG

Youth versus experience
The fir s t dysfunctional phenomenon ' logically bound1
to occur appears to be the con flict between youth-inexperience and age-experience. The general problem of an ' educational generation gap', in which a more highly educated post independence generation of recruits challenges their more experienced and already entrenched seniors has been widely 15 noted.
Of more immediate concern is the fact that until rela tively recently, few universities offered training for planning specialists, nor was the fie ld of study emphasized. The situation is not so much that younger people are placed hierarchically above their seniors -as say was the case 20 with District Officers in Kenya -but that they are placed in a position of having to require their more experienced colleagues in the ministries to conform to-new practices.
When the response from the older administrators has been indifferent or negative, these less experienced, often more enthusiastic officers have become resentful and frustrated.
That such a situation might be temporary is clear; however, in Lesotho, the rapid turnover of staff and the continual promotion out of the Office of its rela tively more experienced members has le f t the Office lacking 21 both experience and seniority.
For example, not one member of. the CPDO who had gained some experience from participating in the formulation of Lesotho's First Plan was s t i l l in the Office when preparation of the country's Second Plan c ommenc ed.
Heightened expectation and suspicion
The publicity and fanfare which typically accompanies the establishment of a central planning agency, and the ' in i t ia l words of support i t receives from the highest p o litic a l quarters, serve to raise considerable expectations of the new agency' s capacity to contribute to the country's progress. I t is highly unlikely, however, that locally qualified personnel w ill be immediately available to f u l f i l such expectations; and even i f they were, anticipated development -based on a probable overestimation of the potential impact of planning -would not follow in consequence.
Simultaneously as expectations are raised, suspicions are aroused among many influential members of the c i v il service, who are disturbed by the new agency's 'trespassing' on th eir territory, demanding new ways of thinking, intruding with new terminology and.advice, and inevitably adding to an already heavy workload. In Lesotho, the■resultant negative attitude towards planning seriously hindered the efforts of the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO), so reducing its chances of early success, and aggravating the extent pi the setback.
Suspicion soon turned to scepticism and vocal criticism once i t became apparent that the new agency was not proving an instant panacaea.
Ambitious terms of reference
Invariably -and certainly in Lesotho -when the planning machinery is established i t is provided with terms of reference which cover the fu ll gamut of planning tasks, including long-term, medium-term and annual plans; research; economic advice; progress reporting, monitoring and evaluation; capital budgets; project preparation; and aid negotiation.
The miniscule staff posted to man the office would be incapable of fu lf illin g these functions even i f supported
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by the necessary data and the fu ll backing of the ministries.
Such a discrepancy appears predetermined in so far as government: and the disparaging description, 'begging o ffic e ' , is applied where in fact i t may be f u lf illin g just the in it ia lly limited role intended for it .
The fir s t plan
Immediately a central planning agency is established, i t is usually required to commence preparation of a five-year plan. Not only w ill the agency i t s e l f lack both personnel and data, but the ministries w ill not have the capacity to prepare satisfactory sectoral submissions.
Although i t s e l f weak, the planning office (which attracts the fir s t qualified planning personnel) is lik ely to have substantially greater planning capacity than the ministries, and thus given the limited time allowed, i t w ill have l i t t l e choice but to take over some of the m inistries' work.
While this in itia tiv e is necessary, fric tio n 'w ill almost invariably follow since the Ministries resist implementing 2 p rojects prepared by an outsiue authority'. _ Pratt illu strates the problem in his discussion of the preparation of Tanzania's fir s t plans the ministries fe lt themselves seriously intruded upon and beleaguered by the Ministry of Development Planning, and several f a i l id entirely to c ooperate•
The suspicions which had been built up during the months of controversy when theplan was being .prepared le ft a heritage of h o stility and a mood of non-cooperation which were important obstacles to the effective implementation of the plan. 24
In Lesotho, preparation of the First Plan took place without benefit of a functioning planning machinery, with limited consultation and weak sectoral contributions.
Because of the 'in a b ility of the Ministries to produce drafts' much of the plan was necessarily written in the CPLO. Had the Planning Ofiice not taken this in itia tiv e the Plan may not have been produced at all--This has the unfortunate effect that some ministries ace committed to implementing policies with which they do not feel involved.
They may have agreed with the drafts in a negative way (i.e -they did not actively disagree with them) but they do not fe el that the policies are their own, or that they need make any special effort to .implement.them. 25
The Planning Office reaped l i t t l e credit for its efforts; rather i t attracted substantial criticism -yet in the circumstances i t is d iffic u lt toimagine how i t could have done much better.
The Plan did l i t t l e to encourage interest in or respect for planning procedures or the -Office. Thepost-Plan mood was not as hostile as indicated in P ratt's example; i t would be more accurate to describe i t as uncooperative and cynically indifferent as to whether ■ projects presented related to the Plan or not.
' Thus in the early years after its publication, the First Plan reinforced the second lag; towards the end of the plan period, however, (as w ill be discussed), i t may be said to have contributed towards overcoming i t .
Contradictory pressures
The pressures exerted on a central planning agency in the early years are not only numerous, they are often contradictory.
Vernon, for example, notes that from the day he commences work the planner is the target of two streams of demands:, one requires him to 'frame policies to meet the c risis already in being, without waiting a moment to improve his knowledge'; the other requires that he 'develop a global long-term strategy that is comprehensive, consistent 9 ii and optimal1. Clearly, overemphasis on one to the neglect of the other involves dangers for the planner.
Similarly, the planner is usually advised that the fir s t plan should be adaptable and flexib le; yet he is also told 27 that i t is intended as a solid guide 'and not a chameleon'.
In Lesotho, expectations and requirements of the CPDO are often contradictory.
While some c iv il servants want i t to take in itia tiv e and lead, others prefer i t to 
I nitiating new' procedures
The preparation of a five-year plan is one of the exercises a central planning agency is required to carry out. I t may face abstacles, and the product may be unsatisfactory; yet, because of a p o litic a l mandate, i t w ill be completed. It w ill also be charged with numerous other tasks, some of which i t w ill be incapable of implementing at the outset but which, from time to time, i t w ill endeavour to introduce* The CPDO's single experiment with an annual plan provides an example. The Office it s e lf put considerable effort into producing the plan, and after much coaxing a number of departments prepared submis ions.
The document was, however, completed too late to be useful and for this and other reasons was not published. This failure meant that the CPDO would have encountered decidedly more resistance had i t attempted to produce a plan the following year, which i t chose not to. A second illu stration is provided by the O ffice's various attempts at instituting progress reporting procedures.
I t has, however, lacked both the capacity to provide helpful responses to those ministries which complied, and the authority to discipline those that did not; that is, i t has been unable to back up the procedures with either rewards or sanctions, and in consequence they have failed. This has adversely affected the O ffice's cred ib ility, so contributing to the second.lag; for its next attempt to institute a reporting system w ill meet with even less c ooperati on.
Limited resources
• The focus of this article is on the evolution of the planning machinery, not on development in general. I f (planning) means we should just set targets, everyone accepts that there is a need for goals. But when that means marshalling scarce resources away from something to put into something else -that' s where the shoe rubs* I f you say to someone that we should like a project in this field , that is not a problemo I f you say we should not like a project in that fie ld because we have only so much money and manpower and executive capacity, and therefore we have to use i t there instead, you have a problem... That' s a hell of a lo t harder and takes a lot more.p muscle than to decide the p rio rities of new money.
Two further consequences were, fir s tly , that departments tended to be more fiercely competitive for the fixed (or slowly expanding) allocation of resources, which impeded the CPDO' s attempts at coordination and harmonization of programmes and, secondly, the Planning O ffice' s discretion to reject offers of aid which i t considered irrelevant to identified national p rio rities was severely curtailed. On the other hand, (as w ill be discussed below), for the CPDO the blessing has not beem unmixed.
I t has benefitted in the following ways. First, in the words of a member of the Planning Office, * W e no longer feel that each time we spend money we are in danger of catching a cold' .
A more expansive approach towards development projects has provided a more congenial atmosphere for the planners. Second, the CPDO is able to approach doners with more confidence that i f necessary Lesotho w ill be able to contribute to local costs of projects. Beyond the raised donor activity, some important fe a s ib ility studies were completed which served to broaden the information base and furnished the detailed technical back-up data essential to requests for assistance. Further, some major under-takings such as the Thaba Bosiu, Khomo-khoana and Thaba Tseka projects have become operative.
This not only provides some concrete examples of project implementation, but helps restore confidence that at least some of the present project documents being prepared and negotiated w ill be transformed into reality.
A fourth point is that, despite the in it ia l negative effects of the First Plan, its presence, towards the end of the quinquennium, appreared to contribute to overcoming the second lag. For, as noted in the paragraph above, development activity picked up considerably and (to the surprise of some) a good number of .the projects commenced had been included (in varying degrees of detail), in the Plan# I t has thus come to be viewed as less unrealistic than originally thought. Further, i t has served to provide Government officers with a rough example of a medium-term plan; and thus when preparation of the Second Plan began they could better envisage the nature of the document.
Ministries have also come to appreciate that the stronger their submissions, the more lik ely they would be to attract, foreign assistance.
Finally, the nature of the senior c iv i l service has altered particularly insofar as the average age of the men and women holding higher positions is younger than was the case fiv e or ten years previously. while becoming a more competent aid negotiating agency, might be in the process of being removed further from policy making (measured in terms of advice sought and/or followed).
Examples of some significant measures instituted without referal into the CPDO were the increases in teachers' salaries, the establishment of a Lesotho National Bus Service furnished with a large consignment of imported vehicles, the building of a royal palace, and the negotiations for the construction of a Hilton Hotel in Maseru* Clearly in a ll these cases there is a substantial p o litic a l and/or prestige element which would be lik ely to preclude the acceptance of planners' views as final on whether to proceed or not* Nevertheless, their advice on the consequences and various aspects of the implementation of these proposals may have been advantageous, and indicative of regard for the CPDO. For instance, .in the case of the decision to proceed with the fe a s ib ility study for an international airport, the Government disagreed with CPDO opposition to the scheme, but at least gave i t the opportunity to study and comment upon proposals,, Here, however, an aid request is involved (since the Government intends to employ foreign rather than domestic resources) and the Cabinet m s.y thus have fe lt compelled to include the Planning Office in the negotiations.
The possibility that the p o litic a l leaders perceive of the planning machinery rather narrowly in terms of its aid-procuring role finds support in two issues of importance in which the CPDO was included.
These concerned the o il c risis -the effects of price increases and the potential effects of South A frica ' s supply being reduced -and the return of large numbers of workers after the trouble on the mines. In both cases one of the principal responses of the Lesotho Government was to seek foreign aid and advice.
v
In conclusion, the planning machinery does appear to have overcome the second lag. I t has established its position in and has been accepted as part of the administration.
In comparison with the fir s t few years of its existence, i t is a markedly more efficien t organization handling a far more complex donor programme. In terms of in itia tin g and administering the various tasks of planning i t has made advances, but these have been limited in the main to those concerned with the procurement of foreign assistance (which the Lesotho Government continues to judge as v ita l to its development programme). Even in those tasks, however, its own management and the response which i t receives leave considerable room for improvement. I t has made disappointing progress in enhancing its capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development schemes and the impact of decisions, policies and programmes on the country's economy and on Basotho society.
Finally, its potential influence on and relevance to central policy-making remain unc ertain.
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